Micro Financing and Their “Mission Drift” Orientation The MENA Region Case  by Saab, Gretta
 Procedia Economics and Finance  30 ( 2015 )  790 – 796 
2212-5671 © 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of IISES-International Institute for Social and Economics Sciences.
doi: 10.1016/S2212-5671(15)01328-3 
ScienceDirect
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
3rd Economics & Finance Conference, Rome, Italy, April 14-17, 2015 and 4th Economics & 
Finance Conference, London, UK, August 25-28, 2015 
Micro financing and their “Mission Drift “orientation The MENA 
region case 
Gretta Saab 
University of Balamand, Qelhat, AMIOUN33, Balamand, Lebanon 
 
Abstract 
Exclusion from the financial systems is widely spread in all developing and less developed economies and only recently efforts 
have been made to formalize financial services to the poor. This article studies the impact of growth of microfinance on the 
economies of less developed countries and if the micro financing sector proved to be beneficial for developing countries in terms 
of poverty alleviation, creating more opportunities and better standards of living. Even though recent findings show that the impact 
of micro financing on economic performance was far below expectations and did not contribute to the attainment of the MDGs, 
this article will try to introduce new nuances to the findings on Mission Drift orientation of these financial institutions. 
Our analysis will focus on factors that are vital to determine the extent of micro financing mission drift issue. The article will also 
attempt to isolate country specificities in this respect as well as the role of cultural and political factors in shifting these institutions 
from their original mission which is serving the poor. 
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1. Introduction 
Since 1997 academic journals published hundreds of peer-reviewed articles on the role of Microfinance in the 
alleviation of poverty as well as its evolution from serving the poor to reach new markets and compete with already 
established banking sector. The role of MFI in providing for the poor has shown recently some kind of “Mission Drift” 
as they start losing their original mission i.e. focus on the poor. In addition, numerous studies such as Cull et al (2009) 
have shown that MFI that offer higher loan sizes are by all means “Mission Drift”. This idea suggests that the role of 
MFI has shifted gradually from financing the poor to compete with a more developed banking sector.  
For this reason, few MFI are considered successful while most of them failed to provide for the basic services as to 
offer small loans for the poor. This evolution has led to question the role of MFI in places where the traditional banking 
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system is well established and if they can deliver by using different lending methodologies, knowing very well that 
the banking sector is more active and flexible in adapting new technologies and serving different groups of people. 
One advantage of the MFI over the banking system is that they serve clients considered too risky for the bank as well 
as concentrate on people that are not served by banks. Armendariz and Szafarz (2009) argued that that the development 
of the financial sector is an important factor to take into account which MFIs are actually serving and they argue that 
if MFIs are offering higher size loans, it does not necessarily mean that these institutions are “mission drift”. Hermes 
et al. (2009) predicted a negative relationship between microfinance and the development of the banking sector as in 
well-developed banking systems, commercial banks are more efficient and can profit from scale advantages and 
diversification.  
In this prospect, many studies have been conducted but few remain conclusive if the MFI are actually serving their 
original mission and which objectives they are pursuing. As per Armendariz and Morduch (2010) the MFI are currently 
trying to fulfill a double objective, reach for the poor and become self-sustainable institutions. 
For this reason the debate on the performance of MFI is still under scrutiny and no final conclusions have been 
made as to their importance in reducing poverty and providing for the basic needs of the poor. Therefore, highlighting 
the relationship between the MFI and the banking sector can help frame the debate on the ‘mission drift” issue and 
evaluate in a better way this distinction. 
The macroeconomic environment in general and the state of development of the financial system in particular 
should be taken into account when evaluating MFI performance and the mission drift phenomena if existing. The 
countries taken into consideration are Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Palestine, Sudan, Syria and 
Yemen. These countries showed sign of maturity in recent years in terms of increased financial service diversity, 
improved credit risk systems, supportive infrastructure and legal and regulatory framework 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: in the second section a literature review linking the role of the 
MFI and their “mission drift” if any is analyzed. In the third section the data, model and results are presented and in 
the fourth section conclusions and implications are given. Much of the Middle East and North Africa region continues 
to be influenced by political developments and the fallouts of the Arab spring and the microfinance sector continue to 
operate in very difficult circumstances.    
2. Literature review  
As it was documented in many articles, namely Mersland and Strom (2009) about the dual mission of financial 
institutions as financial sustainability and providing services to micro-enterprises and low income families, it is worth 
noting that in many instances the MFI drifted from the second objective in order to fulfill the first. Christen and Drake 
(2002) mentioned this when “less poor clients crowd out poorer clients…..” 
Armendariz and Szafarz (2011) said that this phenomenon is not driven by transaction cost minimization alone but 
by the interplay between their own mission and the cost differentials between poor and unbanked wealthier clients. In 
order to pin down the conditions under which microfinance institutions has deviated from its original mission, 
Armendariz and Szafarz (2009) showed also that there is a thin line between mission drift and cross-subsidization 
which makes it more difficult for researchers to show if MFI have really deviated from their original mission which is 
providing for the poor. 
Also the focus of MFI on making profits at the expense of outreach to poorer customers was contested by Rhyne 
(1998) and Christen and Drake (2002) who say that the profit motives of MFI lead them to be more efficient and more 
willing to seek out new markets for their loans. 
However no full investigation  has been undertaken and the world experience showed sometimes that there is no 
mission drift as in Cull et al. (2007) and  in different times a lack of mission drift as per the work of Paxton et al. 
(2000), Christen (2001) and Fernando (2004). The work of Hishigsuren (2007) on Bangladesh showed that no 
significant mission drift but higher efficiency. For these reasons, the growing literature seeking to discover the 
ingredients of MFI success and their failure as they are mission drift proved to be a critical exercise and no final 
conclusion has been reached. 
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The self-sufficiency and sustainability, synonymous in microfinance literature, of the majority of MFI has been 
debated and many authors like Morduch (2000), Woller et al. (1999a) asserted that an MFI should be able to cover its 
operating and financing costs with program revenues. 
The question remains if the Microfinance institutions accomplish their mission, if they are operating efficiently and 
how much profitability is needed for the viability of their programs. In other terms MFI attempt to fulfill a dual 
objective i.e. to reach poor people as well as to become self-sustainable or self-sufficient. The increase in average 
profit and average cost, two hypotheses from Freixas and Rochet (2008), altogether with the uncertainty make it sure 
that the mission drift will occur and the deviation from original mission is looming.  
Schreiner (2002) talk about average loan as one proxy for the depth dimension of outreach (outreach means reaching 
more woman) while most of the studies showed average loan increase as the common indicator among microfinance 
investors and donors to measure the occurrence of the “mission drift symptom”. Our hypothesis is that all MFI need 
to be sustainable and any drift from the initial mission is guided by consideration of profit. In line with Ryhne (1998) 
and Christen and Drake (2002) conjecture that profits and costs may outweigh each other and this will not lead to 
mission drift or lower outreach, Mersland and Strom’s (2010) findings confirm that there is no evidence of mission 
drift. Their results confirm the findings of previous studies done in this context and deter the concerns of Yunus.  
Ghosh and Van Tassel (2008) suggest that the most accurate approach to deal with the mission drift issue is the poverty 
gap ratio, based on poverty line estimates which are still controversial among economists.  
However a study done by Armendariz and Szafarz (2011) pointed out to the fact that outreach-maximizing MFIs 
can deviate from their mission as a result of the interplay of MFI specific parameters and from country specific 
parameters. 
3. Methodology 
In the case of the MENA region, two variables of utmost importance will be tackled: the EDB (Ease of doing 
business) which will be used as a proxy for stability and corruption and the Gini coefficient measuring the inequality 
of income shares in a country, since most of the countries in the MENA region are developing countries. However the 
Gini coefficient is time invariant and a good proxy for poverty could be the average loan size (ALS) as detailed in the 
studies of Cull et al. (2008) and Mosley (1996). Mission drift is observed when an MFI transits from being an NGO 
to an institution seeking profit. The interest rate differential between the banking sector and the MFI is used to tackle 
the chances that the institution is deviating from its original mission which is helping the poor, they are usually lower 
in countries with well-established banking system. The interest rates are much higher for MFI loans than for 
conventional bank loans. The financial sector development will be measured by the ratio of credit to GDP. 
Our variables are led by the Gross loan portfolio of the MFI that will allow testing for the mission drift argument 
and will be used as a proxy for the mission drift phenomena. It is the dependent variable in our panel data analysis. 
This variable will allow us to test for the impact of the different independent variables on the loan size in the MFI.  
We will run a panel data analysis with dependent variable the Gross loan portfolio and independent variables the 
development of the financial sector (credit/GDP), the interest rate differential (ird) .The higher the difference between 
the interest rates in the banking sector and the MFI, the greater is the possibility to drift from its original mission, The 
Ease of doing business (EDB) which is considered as a dummy variable between 0 for low index (below 100) and 1 
for high index (above 100) and the average loan size (ALS)  
Loan portfolio= F (Credit /GDP+ ird +EDB +ALS) 
4. Data 
The discrepancy among the MENA market occurs at their development level as some are showing high levels of 
outreach and scale like in Egypt and Morocco while some others are still at the early stages like in Iraq, Sudan and 
Syria. The latest data showed good improvements in terms of the amount borrowed as well as the number of borrowers. 
If Morocco and Egypt have the biggest number of MFI we can notice that Morocco is ranking first in terms of number 
of borrowers as well as the Gross loan portfolio. In terms of percentage of number of borrowers to population, Morocco 
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exceeds Egypt by far, which highlight the importance of the role of MFI in the economy of Morocco. Microfinance 
institution data on the MENA region comes mainly from the Mix market.org and the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) however this region continues to be one of the smallest markets in terms of MFI and loan portfolio. Running 
the model with the EDB variable showed no particular significance so we removed the EDB from the model and we 
studied the impact of Interest rate spread , Credit to GDP on the Gross loan to the MFI and the Average loan size in 
order to see if they can lead to a mission drift phenomena. 
5. Pooled OLS 
Dependent Variable: GROSS_LOAN_PORTFOLIO  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/27/15   Time: 10:41   
Sample (adjusted): 129 260   
Included observations: 71 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
AVERAGE_LOAN_SIZE 101251.3 23124.85 4.378464 0.0000 
DOMESTIC_CREDIT_TO_PRIV
A -354243.3 307615.7 -1.151578 0.2536 
DUMMY 15558839 30542220 0.509421 0.6122 
INTEREST_RATE_SPREAD__L
E 11177038 3821479. 2.924794 0.0047 
C -45640533 26815840 -1.701999 0.0935 
R-squared 0.260990     Mean dependent var 55124711 
Adjusted R-squared 0.216202     S.D. dependent var 66882454 
S.E. of regression 59212620     Akaike info criterion 38.69899 
Sum squared resid 2.31E+17     Schwarz criterion 38.85833 
Log likelihood -1368.814     Hannan-Quinn criter. 38.76235 
F-statistic 5.827181     Durbin-Watson stat 1.330774 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000445    
 
Estimation Command: 
LS  GROSS_LOAN_PORTFOLIO AVERAGE_LOAN_SIZE DOMESTIC_CREDIT_TO_PRIVA DUMMY  
INTEREST_RATE_SPREAD__LE C 
 
Estimation Equation: 
GROSS_LOAN_PORTFOLIO = C(1)*AVERAGE_LOAN_SIZE + C(2)*DOMESTIC_CREDIT_TO_PRIVA + 
C(3)*DUMMY + C(4)*INTEREST_RATE_SPREAD__LE + C(5) 
 
Substituted Coefficients: 
GROSS_LOAN_PORTFOLIO = 101251.299564*AVERAGE_LOAN_SIZE - 
354243.333593*DOMESTIC_CREDIT_TO_PRIVA + 15558839.4404*DUMMY + 
11177037.7972*INTEREST_RATE_SPREAD__LE - 45640532.7885 
 
Another approach could be the fixed effect estimation. The fixed effect estimation does not accept an explanatory 
variable that is constant over time, dummy variable. We fix this by removing dummy from the regression, and running 
it again.  This will improve our model: both the average loan size and interested rate spread are significant while the 
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domestic credit is not significant. Also there is an improvement in the R2. In our case we removed the dummy 
variable; The Fixed Effect method which assumes different intercepts for each country. 
6. Fixed effect without dummy  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 03/27/15   Time: 10:48   
Sample: 1 272    
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 17   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 71  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -82967208 25335729 -3.274712 0.0019 
AVERAGE_LOAN_SIZE 79825.45 23217.48 3.438162 0.0012 
DOMESTIC_CREDIT_TO_PRIV
A 104471.0 297941.5 0.350643 0.7273 
INTEREST_RATE_SPREAD__L
E 17170559 3646388. 4.708923 0.0000 
 Effects Specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
R-squared 0.581453     Mean dependent var 55124711 
Adjusted R-squared 0.425524     S.D. dependent var 66882454 
S.E. of regression 50693012     Akaike info criterion 38.55300 
Sum squared resid 1.31E+17     Schwarz criterion 39.19037 
Log likelihood -1348.632     Hannan-Quinn criter. 38.80646 
F-statistic 3.728958     Durbin-Watson stat 2.163333 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000091    
*** the study in the Annex shows that causality runs  in both directions exception AVERAGE_LOAN_SIZE which  does not Granger Cause 
INTEREST_RATE_SPREAD__LE 
7. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to examine the link between financial development, Microfinance borrowing 
and the interest rate spreads and the average loan size among others. We have tried to help answer the question if 
micro financing could be absorbed by the banking sector in the MENA region, a completely new young region in the 
microfinance sector. There are limitations in the data available in terms of loans, borrowing and activity in the 
microfinance institutions. Nevertheless, the results reported in this paper are not all consistent with the fact that the 
MFI have less space to move in countries where the banking sector is developed.  The interest rate spread highly affect 
this sector and could lead to a mission drift in case the change is unfavorable. 
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